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Environmental economists and policymakers often advocate market-based environmental
regulatory regimes. While market-based regimes may be structured as Pigouvian taxes, other
market-based regimes, such as tradable pollution permit regimes and conservation easements,
rely upon private transactions in environmental degradation rights to achieve regulatory goals. In
general, once the choice is made to adopt a non-tax-based regime, it is almost always the case
that tax concerns are not discussed. Policymakers err, however, in viewing a choice against the
use of an environmental tax regime as rendering tax concerns irrelevant. I argue that tax
concerns, and tax structures, can have significant effects upon the function and ultimate success
of non-tax market-based environmental regulatory regimes. To demonstrate this point, I consider
the U.S. federal income tax treatment of two market-based environmental regulatory devices—
conservation easements and tradable pollution emission allowances. In particular, I argue that the
current income tax treatment may frustrate the environmental goals of the devices. For example,
donating or selling a conservation easement may result in the deferral or even the elimination of
gains or losses. While the possibility of deferring or eliminating a gain may encourage property
holders to sell or donate conservation easements—a result presumably consistent with
environmental goals—it is also true that the deferral or elimination of a loss may discourage
property holders from selling or donating conservation easements. And there is little reason to
think that the presence of an unrealized gain (or loss) with respect to a piece of property
correlates to desirability of obtaining a conservation easement with respect to that property. As
an example on the tradable emission allowance side, the rules for establishing the tax basis in
grandfathered emission allowances actually work to discourage the trading of permits. However,
trading is key to tradable emission allowance regimes achieving their promise—improvement in
environmental quality at the lowest possible cost. Thus, the tax structure frustrates the market for
allowances, and with it the environmental goals of the regime. The notion that the tax treatment
of market-based environmental regulatory devices should be evaluated from the perspective of
environmental policy does not mean that tax policy concerns should be ignored or compromised.
Neither, however, should environmental policy concerns. Moreover, environmental and tax
policy concerns should be aligned to the extent that that is possible.

